This paper, we propose a modal logic satisfying minimal requirements for reasoning about diagrams via collection of sets and relations between them, following Harel's proposal. We first give an axiomatics of such a theory and then provide its Kripke semantics. Then we extend previous works of ours in order to obtain a decision procedure based on tableaux for this logic. Beside soundness and completeness of our tableaux, we manage to define a strategy of rule application ensuring termination by extending the (...) usual loop test of modal logic S4 to whole sub-structures of the model being computed. (shrink)

Dugundji proved in 1940 that most parts of standard modal systems cannot be characterized by a single finite deterministic matrix. In the eighties, Ivlev proposed a semantics of four-valued non-deterministic matrices (which he called quasi-matrices), in order to characterize a hierarchy of weak modal logics without the necessitation rule. In a previous paper, we extended some systems of Ivlev’s hierarchy, also proposing weaker six-valued systems in which the (T) axiom was replaced by the deontic (D) axiom. In this paper, we (...) propose even weaker systems, by eliminating both axioms, which are characterized by eight-valued non-deterministic matrices. In addition, we prove completeness for those new systems. It is natural to ask if a characterization by finite ordinary (deterministic) logical matrices would be possible for all those Ivlev-like systems. We will show that finite deterministic matrices do not characterize any of them. (shrink)

Trying to overcome Dugundji’s result on uncharacterisability of modal logics by finite logical matrices, Kearns and Ivlev proposed, independently, a characterisation of some modal systems by means of four-valued multivalued truth-functions , as an alternative to Kripke semantics. This constitutes an antecedent of the non-deterministic matrices introduced by Avron and Lev . In this paper we propose a reconstruction of Kearns’s and Ivlev’s results in a uniform way, obtaining an extension to another modal systems. The first part of the paper (...) is devoted to four-valued Nmatrices, including Kearns’s and Ivlev’s. Besides proving with full details Kearns’s results for T, S4 and S5, we also obtain a characterisation of the system B by four-valued Nmatrices with level valuations. Concerning Ivlev’s results, two new modal systems are introduced and char.. (shrink)

The primary goal of the present research was to determine the order of swimmers on a mixed relay team that would ensure the best performance in the Fédération Internationale de Natation World Championships held in Kazan, Budapest, and Gwangju. The data were obtained from database websites for the 4 × 100 m freestyle and 4 × 100 m medley official results,1 including 660 records from 188 entries of finals and 472 preliminary events. The results showed that the fastest swimmers were (...) located primarily in the first or second positions of the freestyle relay. The most successful gender strategy for the 4 × 100 m freestyle and for the 4 × 100 m medley relays was the order male-male-female-female, although no statistical differences were found for the medley relays. In the 4 × 100 m freestyle, the second and third relay legs had a statistical effect on the total relay time, whereas in the 4 × 100 m medley, all four relay legs had a statistical effect on the final performance, the weight of the four strokes being different in heats with respect to the final round. Also, a later position of the first female swimmer or the consecutive position of two female swimmers in the team order significantly affected the relay performance in specific events. Mixed relay events appeared to present specific strategies in comparison to traditional male- or female-only relay lineups. (shrink)

This book looks at the ways in which conditionals, an integral part of philosophy and logic, can be of practical use in computer programming. It analyzes the different types of conditionals, including their applications and potential problems. Other topics include defeasible logics, the Ramsey test, and a unified view of consequence relation and belief revision. Its implications will be of interest to researchers in logic, philosophy, and computer science, particularly artificial intelligence.

ABSTRACT We consider the question of the complete axiomatization of a relative modal logic with composition and intersection.

Psychology research on men studies, attractiveness, and partner preferences has evolved from the influence of sociobiological perspectives to the role of interactions in shaping election toward sexual–affective relationships and desire toward different kinds of masculinities. However, there is a scientific gap in how language and communicative acts among women influence the kind of partner they feel attracted to and in the reproduction of relationship double standards, like the myth of the “warrior’s rest” where female attractiveness to “bad boys” is encouraged (...) or supported. Some women imitate “the warrior” behavior of men by choosing dominant traditional masculinities to have “fun” with and oppressed traditional masculinities for “rest” after the “fun” with DTM—choosing an OTM for a stable relationship, but perhaps without passion, while also feeling attraction toward DTM, a response which perpetuates the chauvinist double standard that the feminist movement has condemned when men behave in this sexist way. Through conducting a qualitative study with communicative daily life stories, this article explores, on the one hand, how language and social interaction among women can lead to the reproduction of the DTM role by women and, on the other hand, also how new alternative masculinities offer an alternative by explicitly rejecting, through the language of desire, to be the rest for the female warrior, the second fiddle to any woman. This has the potential to become a highly attractive alternative to DTM. Findings provide new knowledge through the analysis of communicative acts and masculinities evidencing the importance of language uses in the reproduction of the double standards in gender relations and to understand how and why these practices are maintained and which kind of language uses can contribute to preventing them. Implications for research and interventions on preventive socialization of gender violence are discussed. (shrink)

Dugundji proved in 1940 that most parts of standard modal systems cannot be characterized by a single finite deterministic matrix. In the eighties, Ivlev proposed a semantics of four-valued non-deterministic matrices, in order to characterize a hierarchy of weak modal logics without the necessitation rule. In a previous paper, we extended some systems of Ivlev’s hierarchy, also proposing weaker six-valued systems in which the axiom was replaced by the deontic axiom. In this paper, we propose even weaker systems, by eliminating (...) both axioms, which are characterized by eight-valued non-deterministic matrices. In addition, we prove completeness for those new systems. It is natural to ask if a characterization by finite ordinary logical matrices would be possible for all those Ivlev-like systems. We will show that finite deterministic matrices do not characterize any of them. (shrink)

Linguistics of Saying is to be analyzed in the speech act conceived as an act of knowing. The speaking, saying and knowing subject, based on contexts and the principles of congruency and trust in the speech of other speakers, will create meanings and interpret the sense of utterances supplying the deficiencies of language by means of the intellective operations mentally executed in the act of speech. In the intellective operations you can see three steps or processes: first the starting point, (...) intuition or aísthesis; second, the process of abstraction; and third, the inverse: the process of determination or fixing the construct created. (shrink)

Linguistics of saying studies language in its birth. Language is the mental activity executed by speaking subjects. Linguistics of saying consists in analyzing speech acts as the result of an act of knowing. Speaking subjects speak because they have something to say. Tthey say because they define themselves before the circumstance they are in. And this is possible because they are able to know. Speaking, then, is speaking, saying and knowing. In this sense there is a progressive determination. Knowing makes (...) possible saying, and saying determines speaking, or, in other words: speaking involves saying and knowing, and saying involves knowing. The problem thus is to determine the meaningful intentional purpose of the individual speaker to say something in every speech act. (shrink)

Language is nothing but human subjects in as much as they speak, say and know. Language is something coming from the inside of the speaking subject manifest in the intentional meaningful purpose of the individual speaker. A language, on the contrary, is something coming from the outside, from the speech community, something offered to the speaking subject from the tradition in the technique of speaking. The speech act is the performance of an intuition by the subject, both individual and social.

El lenguaje o la actividad cognoscitiva del ser humano que se debate en su lucha contra la circunstancia en la que le ha tocado vivir es hablar, decir y conocer. El hombre habla porque tiene algo que decir, dice porque se define a sí mismo ante la circunstancia en la que vive en cada momento, y esto es posible porque conoce de forma creativa. En este sentido el decir determina el hablar, por arriba, y el conocer por abajo. El conocer (...) humano empieza en una sensación sensible, la aísthesis, la cual es transformada en un universal, extracto o concepto, logos, el cual es el fruto de una serie de operaciones intelectivas realizadas por el propio sujeto en u solo acto, el acto único de hablar, decir y conocer. (shrink)

Del 15 al 17 de noviembre de 2012 tuvo lugar el Congreso de Teo-logía “A los 50 años del Concilio Vaticano II ”, organizado por las Facultades de Teología de España y Portugal, en el Auditorio Juan Pablo II de la Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca. El acto inaugural fue presidido por el cardenal Antonio María Rouco Varela, arzobispo de Madrid y presidente de la Conferencia Episco-pal Española, titular del centro académico.

The human subject in as much as he knows transforms the sensitive and concrete (the thing perceived) into abstract (an image of the thing perceived), the abstract into an idea (imaginative representation of the thing abstracted), and ideas into contents of conscience (meanings). The last step in the creation of meanings, something being executed in the speech act, consists in fixing the construct mentally created thus making it objectified meanings in the conscience of speakers. The interchange amongst the different steps (...) in the creation of meaning manifests lógos, the state lived by speakers in their interior when speaking, created and developed in words and because of words. (shrink)

Speakers live language, that is, they intuit, create, acquire, perform, speak and say, interpret, use, evaluate and, even, speak of language. The real language is the language lived by speakers. On the contrary linguists, who at the same time are speakers and linguists, study language as something manifesting of front of them. In order to study language it is necessary to determine the degree of reality of the thing called language as the reality lived and used by speakers.

Mi concepción sobre el lenguaje parte de tres realidades ciertas: el hablar (Coseriu), el decir (Ortega y Gasset), y el conocer (Descartes, Kant, Ortega y Gasset), tres realidades tan ciertas como que yo vivo porque estoy haciendo algo ahora mismo. Y este hacer algo constituye mi vida (Ortega y Gasset). Yo soy porque vivo y porque tengo la necesidad de hablar con otros seres humanos, quienes constituyen mi circunstancia, para definirme a mí mismo (decir) sobre aquello de lo que hablo (...) para conseguir un fin, aunque este sólo sea pasajero y volátil. La aparición del hablar, decir y conocer en el acto lingüístico nos revela el pensamiento y lo que llamamos el lenguaje y la lengua. Además, estas realidades radican en mí, en el ser humano, y manifiestan la condición de ser del ser humano, quien es capaz de conocer creativamente, definirse ante la situación que analiza antes de hablar (=decir), y de hablar utilizando palabras que no son suyas sino de la comunidad lingüística (=la lengua, Coseriu) en la que vive (Ortega y Gasset). Así, pues, considero el lenguaje como realidad que subyace en la conciencia del ser humano individual que habla, dice y conoce. (shrink)

Meaning defines language because it is the internal function of language. At the same time, meaning does not exist unless in language and because of language. From the point of view of the speaking subject meaning is contents of conscience. From the point of view of a language, meaning is the objectification of knowledge in linguistic signs. And from the point of view of the individual speaking subject, meaning is the expressive intentional purpose to say something.

When we speak of language we usually use the concept of a particular language. In this sense the concept denoted with the word language may vary from one language to another. Real language (=the language spoken) on the contrary is the reality lived by speakers thus encompassing complex and multifarious activities. Depending on the language spoken, the modes of thinking, modes of being in the conception of things, and systems of beliefs transmitted by means of particular languages, denote the living (...) reality of language with different grammatical categories. The concept “language” is expressed sometimes with a noun, thus denoting something existing in it; sometimes with a verb, thus denoting an action or an activity; and sometimes with an adverb, thus denoting the mode of an activity. The reality or degree of reality implicit in these grammatical categories involves a particular mode of thinking, prompted with a particular mode of being in the conception of things. Because of this it is necessary to distinguish the concept of language as something different from the reality of language. But first of all it is necessary to determine the reality or degree of reality of both the reality lived by speakers and the thing usually conceived of as language or a language. (shrink)

The most comprehensive manifestation of language can be seen in the activity of speaking. In it the activity of speaking cannot be understood unless it is referred to the concepts of language and a language. Anything in language can be found in the activity of speaking. Because of this you can find what language is if you abstract from the innumerable manifestations of the activity of speaking.

Meaning as the original function of language is the arrangement of internal things on the part of the creative and historical individual subject who speaks a particular language. Meaning constitutes the series of contents making up the linguistic world human subjects can manage real things with. Real things are not described with meanings but merely represented and designated. Meanings represent the essence of things thus making them members of a category. In this sense, meaning is the base to create things (...) in as much as they constitute entities. Only through the operation of determination can meanings designate individual real things. Since meaningful categories are intended to particular purposes, meaning is intentional and inclusive. (shrink)